UT: Wie andere ex-Sowjetrepubliken die Abhängigkeit von Russland reduzieren

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    • UT: Wie andere ex-Sowjetrepubliken die Abhängigkeit von Russland reduzieren

      Interessanter Artikel in der UT: Energy Quasi-Empire (Some post-soviet republics have staunchly chosen to diversify their energy flows. As a result, they are successfully exiting the trap of energy dependence). Es geht darum, wie z.B. Usbekistan und Turkmenistan sich konsequent Schritt für Schritt immer unabhängiger vom russischen Gastransportsystem machen und sich dadurch in die Lage versetzen, die eigenen Gasvorkommen an Gazprom vorbei zu verkaufen. Die russische Reaktion zeigt deutlich, dass denen sehr bewusst ist, welch eine Bedrohung das für ihre wirtschaftlichen und politischen Ambitionen darstellt:
      Moscow’s response to all this is fairly sensitive. Dmitri Medvedev has claimed the construction of the Transcaspian Pipeline without the consent of all Caspian countries is impossible, while Konstantin Simonov, Chairman of the Russian National Foundation for Energy Security, has threatened other parties that Russia’s response will be “tough, and probably in a military form.”

      Yet, Western countries have acted decisively. Richard Morningstar, Special Envoy of the United States Secretary of State for Eurasian Energy, and his advisor Daniel Stein have said in both Baku and Ashgabat respectively that “no force will interfere” once the EU, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan agree on the implementation of the Transcaspian pipeline. Matthew Bryza, US Ambassador to Turkmenistan, stated that the US is already thinking of ways to help Azerbaijan protect its energy infrastructure on the Caspian basin.

      Russiawill have nothing to outweigh gas deals between the EU and Central Asian countries, particularly if supported by the US and NATO. By contrast, a plausible prospect is for Russian diplomacy to intensify its efforts in Europe, the consumption end of the new gas chain. It has always been based on “caring about the energy security of Russia’s European partners,” segregating them with all kinds of privileges and stories about the “ephemeral Russian threat” and “lack of reason behind the European search for an alternative to its conventional reliable partners.” Also, Russia might try to affect the situation in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan internally by discouraging their ambition for proactive independent steps. As Transcaucasia and Middle Asian states intensify efforts to use their resources for their own good, Russia looses much of the leverage it needs to play the energy game with the EU and China successfully.